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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
t

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appel lee,

i

v,

s

AARON OLSEN,

i

Defendant/ Appellant•

"--

QrtfURl

-Priority No, 2

:

BRIEF Ul'' APPELI..KK •
JURlSDlC'llbU A M J NATURE Ul PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Aaron ulsen appeals his conviction nf
aggravated robbery, in violation of Utah Code Ann
( 11"'! i l l |
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"erch i:t

Second Jud i" i e I District Court, in and h i
Honorable Stanton M Tiiy 1 ni , pII'PS I d i in|

\ ui-^
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County,

I
I

jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann, t, 'B 2-2

(Supp. 1992).

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1

p i I il 1 he lack of a f or-cause challenge to a single

prospective juror, who was then peremptorily challenged by
cli j f eindfi i I I

•

assistance

. counsel f " such that defendant

• • ni I III i ' i I 11n" i

" "j • • ' i v e

' 11 I a 1 1 1 i > i 1 1 i

be reversed? (responding to Point-

<

convictxw should
*^

* Appellant).

counsel Ineffectiveness claims present questions of law, reviewed
on the trial record.

Both such c'lainis

ho— -

i-idrly idisiuti tin

affirmatively demonstrate v,\..

:

error and resulting prejudice.

See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116

(Utah 1989) (explaining both doctrines).
2.

Did the trial court properly admit eyewitness

identification of defendant by the robbery victim, even though
there was some uncertainty in that identification?

In State v.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 1991), this question of
constitutional due process was identified as one of law, reviewed
nondeferentially; however, the relevant underlying fact findings
are reviewed only for "clear error."

Even so, "on occasion, the

legal standard for admissibility of evidence vests a measure of
discretion in the trial court."
3.

Id., at 781 n.3.

Did the trial court properly admit statements of an

alleged co-conspirator as evidence against defendant?

As set

forth in defendant's brief, this question, dealing with a rule of
evidence, is reviewed under a deferential, "clear error"
standard.

State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The texts of pertinent constitutional provisions,

statutes, and rules will be set forth as needed in the body of
this brief, or appended.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery and
conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery (R. 49-50).1

The

conspiracy charge was dismissed at the close of the State's trial
*The main record is designated "R." "T." refers to the
transcript of the August 1990 trial. "T. 8/20/90" refers to the
hearing of defendant's pretrial motion in limine.
2

evidence
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defendant
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sentenced to a term of five years to life at the Utah State
Prison,

pi HIS

a consecutive
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tins appeal ensued.
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The a r r e s t r e p o r t i n d i c a t e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t i s f i v e
n i n e i n c h e s t a J ] , w e i g h t ] 60 p o u n d s , b l o n d - h a i r e d (R. 1
3

$16,000 cash (T. 91-92, 139, 141, 343). The robber seized the
bags, ordering Mouille to lie on the ground and not look at him
(T. 99)*

Mouille laid down, but continued to watch the robber as

he ran away with the two mail bags (T. 99-100).
As the robber fled, Mouille saw and hailed another UPS
employee, Mike Harris, who was driving a UPS "package car" (T.
101-02).

Mouille told Harris about the robbery, and went to call

the police; Harris pursued the robber (T. 102, 121). Harris saw
the robber running away with the two UPS mail bags (T. 122). He
took his eyes off the robber for an instant to talk to Mouille,
then saw a car leave the area where the robber had been headed
(T. 121, 126). Believing that the robber had entered the car,
Harris pursued it (T. 123, 131-33).
The getaway car was distinctive—new looking, shiny,
four doors, shortened trunk—appearing to Harris as "something
like a Cadillac" (T. 122). He later matched the car to a
Cadillac Seville at a local dealership (T. 372). Harris followed
the Cadillac in his large, slow UPS package car, but was unable
to keep up (T. 123). Before finally losing contact, Harris heard
two "pops," like gunshots, from the Cadillac.

It then turned

left at a red light, causing Harris to lose it (T. 124).
An Inside Job
A UPS investigator, working with the police, quickly
determined that the robbery had elements of an "inside job."
the eight to ten feeder trucks passing through the Ogden UPS
center on any given day, only one would be carrying cash.
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However, the bag also contained a business card for
LeeAnn Leavitt (T. 342-43, 354, 249). The card had fingerprints,
one of which proved to be defendant's (T. 393). A note was
penned on the card to somebody named Troy (T. 353-54), who turned
out to be Troy Powell.
Talking to LeeAnn Leavitt, investigators learned that
Powell was the boyfriend of LeeAnn's roommate, Shannon Fairbanks
(T. 354). LeeAnn's card had been left in the door of Powell's
Salt Lake City apartment on the night of the robbery (T. 88, 246,
249-52, 356). LeeAnn and Shannon had called on Powell after
midnight, not found him home, and left a note for him on the card
(T. 250-51, 256, 285-86).
LeeAnn knew Cary Nichols as Powell's friend, and told
the investigators that Nichols worked for UPS (T. 354-55, 25354).

She described Nichols and Powell both as dark-haired.

Because Mouille, the robbed UPS driver, had described the robber
as blond-haired, the investigators asked if Nichols and Powell
had a blond-haired friend:

LeeAnn promptly gave them defendant's

name and description (T. 355-56, 254-55).3
Big Spender
LeeAnn Leavitt also knew that Powell and defendant each
drove a new Cadillac Seville.

Powell's Cadillac was white;

defendant drove a silver one (T. 250, 256-57).
3

As it turned out,

Shannon Fairbanks, as it happened, had gone target shooting
with Powell and Nichols some time before the UPS robbery. A
black, non-revolver pistol, apparently owned by Powell, had been
used (T. 296-97); this resembled the robber's weapon, seen by
J.C. Mouille (T. 97).
6

the Cadillacs were rented.

The white one had been rented by

Powell the day before the UPS robbery (T. 231). The silver
Cadillac had been rented by Nichols two weeks before the robbery,
but it was not returned until after the robbery; defendant was
listed on the rental agreement as an additional driver of that
vehicle (T. 234-37).

Viewing a photograph of the white Cadillac

at trial, LeeAnn identified it as the one driven by Powell (T.
256).

Viewing the same photograph, Mike Harris, who had pursued

the robber from the Ogden UPS center, identified the vehicle as
resembling the getaway Cadillac (T. 122-23).
Shannon Fairbanks attended a barbecue shortly after the
robbery; Powell, Nichols, and defendant were also present (T.
295).

Shannon observed that defendant had apparently just made a

substantial clothing purchase for his young child, who
accompanied him to the barbecue (T. 295-96, 310-11).
Further, on the day after the robbery, defendant paid
cash, totalling $1620.00, for two suits and other clothing (T.
304-05).

Defendant's employment income at that time, however,

was very low:

he had been employed for about two months as a

communications equipment salesman, and had only been paid some
thirty dollars during that time, apparently due to normal delay
in finalizing sales and paying commissions (T. 219-20, 222). In
fact, before the robbery, defendant had been borrowing money from
his employer (T. 221, 223), as well as from one of his brothers,
with whom he lived (T. 409, 413).

7

The Arrests
Informed of the robbery's circumstances, LeeAnn Leavitt
and Shannon Fairbanks agreed to assist with the investigation (T.
260, 287, 357). Investigators placed listening devices in the
women's apartment.

Shannon then called Powell (T. 261, 357); he

and Nichols came to the apartment, where the women told them
about the robbery investigation (T. 262, 288). The foursome
discussed what LeeAnn and Shannon should or should not say to the
investigators (T. 263-65, 360, 363). The men discussed ways of
avoiding the police; Powell suggested going to Australia (T. 289,
365)/

At that point, the listening investigators entered the

women's apartment and arrested the men (T. 266, 292, 365).
Upon arresting Powell and Nichols, the investigators
proceeded to search Powell's apartment (T. 365). There they
found a trash bag of the apparent same brand and type as the one
containing the stolen UPS property and LeeAnn Leavitt's business
card, found at the Provo post office (T. 366-68).

Further, while

the search was in progress, LeeAnn and Shannon, sitting in a
police car outside the premises, saw defendant drive up in the
silver Cadillac, apparently survey the situation, and then leave
(T. 268-72, 292-93).
Defendant was arrested later that day, at the apartment
he shared with his two brothers (T. 410-11, 430). The silver
Cadillac was not then seized; instead, one of defendant's

4

The trial court disallowed any reference to defendant in
recounting this conversation (T. 265-66, 366, T. 8/20/90 at 5).

8

brothers moved it to a nearby parking lot (T. 411), from where it
apparently was returned to the rental agency (T. 235-36).
Eyewitness Identification
On the day after the arrests, J.C. Mouille was shown a
photo array containing defendant's picture, but could not
identify defendant as his robber (T. 106, 110-11).
viewed a live, seven-person lineup.

Later, he

At the lineup, Mouille

selected defendant and another individual for closer scrutiny (T.
111).

Mouille stated that if he had to choose, he would identify

defendant as the robber (T. 112-13).

At trial, the jury heard

the basis for Mouille's uncertain identification:

The robber,

Mouille testified, had appeared "skinny" because of the way he
had worn his vest (T. 113). At the lineup, defendant looked
relatively muscular; Mouille therefore selected defendant, whose
face looked like the robber's, and the other individual, who
appeared to be built more like the robber (T. 114-15).
The Verdict
Defendant was tried separately from Powell and Nichols
(R. 14, 17). The conspiracy charge was dismissed after the
presentation of evidence, but the trial court let stand all
testimony relating to the robbery conspiracy among defendant,
Powell, and Nichols (T. 437, 464-66).

A pretrial motion to bar

J.C. Mouille's eyewitness identification testimony had also been
denied (R. 46-48, T. 8/20/90 at 14-16).

However, an instruction

advising the jury to scrutinize eyewitness testimony very
carefully, along the lines of State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493-94
9

nn.7 & 8 (Utah 1986), was given (R. 84-87; copy appended to this
brief).

On the aggravated robbery charge, a unanimous guilty

verdict was returned (R. 71, T. 468-69).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant has shown neither plain error nor ineffective
assistance of counsel in jury selection.

There was no "palpable"

error in not challenging a single, possibly police-favoring juror
for cause, and instead using a peremptory challenge to remove
that juror.

Even if that decision was questionable, defendant

enjoys no presumption of prejudice.

Instead, because there is no

evidence that the actual trial jury was biased, defendant's jury
selection argument fails.
Robbery victim J.C. Mouille was properly allowed to
testify about his identification of defendant.

Defendant's

reliance on state constitution-based law on this point is
misplaced, for he raised no state constitutional argument in the
trial court, and he has made no showing that the law in question,
issued well after his trial, should apply retroactively.

Even

under that law, Mouille's testimony would have been admissible.
Finally, the jury was fully apprised of the uncertainties of
Mouille's eyewitness identification, and was correctly instructed
to scrutinize his testimony with care.
Various statements made by one of defendant's alleged
coconspirators were properly admitted and allowed to stand as
evidence, even though the conspiracy charge was dismissed.
Defendant's tie to the robbery scheme was shown by, among other

10

things, his connection to a Cadillac rented by one of the
coconspirators, and by his fingerprint on the card addressed to
the other coconspirator, found among the discarded robbery
proceeds.

This independent evidence of conspiracy allowed the

trial court to admit statements made in its furtherance.
Further, apart from the specific rule allowing admission of
coconspirator statements, the statements in issue here were not
hearsay, and therefore were properly admitted.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
NEITHER "PLAIN ERROR" NOR "INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL" OVERCOME DEFENDANT'S
TRIAL-LEVEL WAIVER OF A POSSIBLE FOR-CAUSE
JUROR CHALLENGE.
In his first two points on appeal, defendant argues
that a single prospective juror, Mr. Hodge, should have been
removed for cause.

Hodge stated during voir dire that he

expected police officers, because of their training, to be more
accurate observers than lay witnesses (T. 50). 5 The trial court
followed up on this, quizzing Hodge and Mr. Creager, another
juror who had made a similar statement, about whether they could
assess truthfulness of police testimony independently, as with a
lay witness (T. 53-55).

Creager answered "I don't think so," and

was excused for cause (T. 55). Hodge, however, answered "I think
I can be neutral" (T. 56), and was passed for cause without

5

Hodge was a city building and zoning inspector, and had
occasionally assisted police investigations by, for example,
drawing crime scene diagrams (T. 35, 50).

11

objection from defense counsel (T. 65). Counsel then used his
first peremptory challenge to remove Hodge (R. 62).
A.

"Plain Error" and "Counsel Ineffectiveness" Test.
Recognizing that for-cause juror challenges not made in

the trial court are normally waived on appeal, see State v.
DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988), defendant argues that it
was either "plain error" or "ineffective assistance of counsel"
to pass Hodge for cause (Br. of Appellant at 9, 14). Neither
argument affords relief from his trial-level waiver.
The "plain error" and "ineffective counsel" doctrines
are virtually identical, each involving a two-element test.

For

plain error, the first element requires an error that is
"obvious" or "palpable."
n.ll (Utah 1989).

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 &

As for counsel ineffectiveness, a claimed

miscue must violate "the wide latitude counsel must have in
making tactical decisions," Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 688-89 (1984).
same.

The second element of both tests is the

The "palpable" error, or counsel miscue, must affect the

trial outcome:

that is, absent the error or miscue, "a

reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result" must exist.
Verde, 770 P.2d at 118-19 & n.2 (explaining Strickland), 122 &
n.12 (explaining plain error).

With certain exceptions not

pertinent here, the burden is on the appealing party to prove
both elements of each test.

Id.

12

B.

No "Palpable" Error or Counsel Miscue.
Defendant has not carried his burden here.

The trial

court did not "palpably" err in passing juror Hodge for cause.
To the contrary, it correctly distinguished the accuracy of
officer observations from officer truthfulness, or honesty, in
relating those observations.6

Juror Creager, who expressed an

inability or unwillingness to distinguish these concepts, was
excused for cause; Hodge, stating his belief that he could be
neutral on the honesty issue, was legitimately passed for
cause.7

That trial court decision, based in part upon Hodge's

demeanor and credibility, is not subject to appellate reversal
absent clear error.

See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,

156 (1878) (trial court decision to pass juror for cause is
reversed only for "manifest" error, where "the law left nothing
to the 'conscience or discretion' of the court").
Nor did trial counsel perform unacceptably in passing
Hodge for cause.

The "accuracy-honesty" distinction regarding

police testimony, applied by the trial court, could certainly be
recognized by counsel.

In any event, counsel's decision to

remove Hodge with a peremptory challenge, rather than make a for-

6

Regarding the former, this Court has noted that officer
training and experience provides heightened observational
accuracy. See State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986).
7

This case does not even remotely resemble the situation in
State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981), heavily relied upon by
defendant. There two jurors acknowledged "bitter[ness]" and a
"very emotional link," respectively, to the case to be tried, as
past victims of similar crimes, id. at 882. Here juror Hodge
expressed no such strong emotional feelings.
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cause challenge, was permissible.

State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401,

406 (Utah 1986); c^. State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 176 (Utah
App. 1992) (counsel permissibly waived a peremptory challenge in
order to seat full jury).8

This Court has properly refused to

condemn trial counsel tactics "simply because another lawyer,
e.g., appellate counsel, would have taken a different course."
State v. Jones. 823 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Utah 1991).
C.

No Resulting Prejudice.
Defendant's "plain error" and "counsel ineffectiveness"

attacks on jury selection can be rejected solely upon his failure
to show either "palpable" error or a clear counsel miscue.

See

Verde, 770 P.2d at 118-19 (failure to show either element of
counsel ineffectiveness defeats the claim).

Further, defendant

makes no attempt to show prejudice, or a reasonable likelihood of
more favorable trial outcome, absent the argued jury selection
error or miscue.
In fact, defendant acknowledges that he cannot
demonstrate actual prejudice, given that the argued error "is in
the jury selection process" (Br. of Appellant at 13 n.6).
Instead, he urges this Court to find prejudice on the basis that
juror Hodge was removed with a peremptory challenge, when in
defendant's present, after-the-fact opinion, Hodge should have
been removed for cause.
8

Trial counsel may have even considered seating Hodge.
Hodge had served on two prior juries, one in a criminal case
resulting in a hung jury (T. 44-45). This may have been among
the "numerous factors," Frame, 723 P.2d at 406, figuring into
counsel's decision to pass Hodge for cause.
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It is indeed a "well-established" Utah rule that
forcing a party to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror
who should have been removed for cause constitutes reversible
error.

State v. Moton, 749 P.2d 639, 642 (Utah 1988).

However,

no Utah case has applied this "automatic prejudice" rule in a
situation where, as here, the questioned juror was not challenged
for cause in the trial court.

Indeed, application of automatic

prejudice in this context would effectively gut the waiver rule,
a rule that, again, clearly applies to jury selection.

Utah R.

Crim. P. 18(c)(2) ("A challenge to an individual juror may be
made only before the jury is sworn to try the action, [or] before
any of the evidence is presented"); DeMille, 756 P.2d at 83-85;
State v. Miller, 674 P.2d 130, 131 (Utah 1983).
Even where a for-cause juror challenge is made in the
trial court, and it is subsequently ruled that the challenge
should have been granted, the United States Supreme Court has
held that there is no presumption of prejudice.

Instead,

defendant must show that the jury that actually sat was biased.
See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988) (juror erroneously
retained upon for-cause challenge was removed by peremptory
challenge.

Held:

no relief required absent showing that jury

that actually sat was biased).9

In asking to find automatic

Relieving that the Ross rule has merit, and that the
"automatic prejudice" rule is based upon questionable logic, the
State has petitioned this Court to review a recent Utah Court of
Appeals opinion regarding jury selection. See State v. Kavmark,
195 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah App. Sept. 16, 1992), petition for
certiorari No. 920477 (filed Oct. 15, 1992).
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prejudice here, then, defendant urges a lower threshold for
reversible unpreserved error than the federal Supreme Court has
set for preserved jury selection error.

This Court should reject

defendant's urging, and thereby promote the finality of this and
other criminal judgments where no showing of an unreliable trial
verdict can be made.
In sum, defendant has shown neither plain error nor
counsel ineffectiveness in the selection of his trial jury.
Accordingly, his present challenge to prospective juror Hodge,
not raised in the trial court, should be rejected.
POINT TWO
THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY OF
THE ROBBERY VICTIM WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO
EVIDENCE.
Relying exclusively on State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774
(Utah 1991), defendant next argues that the admission of J.C.
Mouille's eyewitness testimony, identifying defendant at trial as
the armed UPS robber, was reversible error.

For several reasons,

this argument fails.
A.

Waiver and Non-Retroactivitv of New Law.
First, Ramirez was not decided until April 1991, well

after defendant's August 1990 trial.

Ramirez established state

constitution-based criteria for admission of eyewitness
identification testimony, yet defendant's motion to disallow
Mouille's testimony advanced no state constitutional ground (R.
47-48, T. 8/20/90 at 14-16)•

He thereby waived any extra

protection the state constitution might have afforded him.
16

State

v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985) (grounds not raised
in support of pretrial motion to suppress will not be considered
on appeal absent special circumstances).
Also, the Ramirez court acknowledged that its "decision
on this issue breaks new ground under the Utah Constitution," 817
P.2d at 778, before setting forth new rules for admitting
eyewitness identification testimony, id., at 780-82.

"When a new

rule of criminal procedure constitutes a clear break with the
past, it is not generally applied retroactively."
814 P.2d 1119, 1123-24 (Utah 1991) (citing cases).

State v. Hoff,
Defendant has

made no argument that Ramirez should apply retroactively;
therefore, he cannot rely on it to reverse the trial court's
admission of Mouille's eyewitness identification testimony.10
B.

Evidence Sufficient to Support Admissibility.
Second, it does not appear that any pre-Ramirez case

clearly required a special evidentiary hearing on the admission
of eyewitness identification testimony, as seemingly now required
under Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778 (alluding to "foundation" and
"preliminary factual findings").

Most significantly, State v.

Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), a major Ramirez progenitor, did
not deal with admissibility of such testimony at all.

Instead,

Long dealt solely with the need for a precautionary jury

10

Had defendant raised such an argument, it would seem to be
defeated by State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). Long
requires special jury instructions on the reliability of
eyewitness identifications. However, that requirement was made
prospectively applicable only, id. at 492 ("from this date
forward, trial courts shall give such an instruction . . . " ) .
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instruction about eyewitness testimony, 721 P.2d at 487-95,
obviously presupposing admissibility.
Consistent with pre-Ramirez law, the non-evidentiary
hearing on defendant's motion to exclude Mouille's eyewitness
identification testimony, reviewing and proffering preliminary
hearing evidence on the issue (T. 8/20/90 at 11), was sufficient
for purposes of deciding admissibility.

That hearing gave the

trial court sufficient information to make its preliminary
reliability and admissibility determination under Rule 104(a),
Utah Rules of Evidence.
Indeed, despite the eyewitness problems chronicled in
Long, Mouille's testimony was clearly admissible under Rule 602,
Utah Rules of Evidence.

That rule only requires "personal

knowledge" of the events in question, meaning that the witness
must merely have the opportunity and capacity to perceive them.
State v. Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29, 33 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S.
814 (1989).

As did the victim in Eldredae, Mouille, the robbery

victim here, certainly had such personal knowledge.
C.

Admissibility Under the New Law.
Third, even if the Ramirez rules for admitting

eyewitness identification testimony might apply here, the Ramirez
outcome defeats defendant's argument.

Identification of the

nighttime robber in Ramirez was far more problematic than that
here.

The Ramirez robber was masked, crouched down, and viewed

from ten to thirty feet away, 817 P.2d at 782; the robber here
was unmasked, standing at least sufficiently erect to get some
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idea of his height, and approached within five to six feet of
Mouille (T. 99, 108-10).

Identification of the Ramirez robber

was hindered by the fact that his accomplice was assaulting the
eyewitness with a pipe during the robbery, 817 P.2d at 783; here
Mouille had no such distraction.

Defendant Ramirez was also

subjected to a "blatantly suggestive[]" one-man showup shortly
after the robbery, id. at 784, an element lacking here.
Despite these problems and others, and acknowledging
that they created "an extremely close case," the admission of the
eyewitness identification testimony in Ramirez was affirmed on
appeal.

817 P.2d at 784. The admission of Mouille's eyewitness

identification testimony here, not nearly so close a question,
would clearly be affirmed under Ramirez, were it applicable.
Accordingly, the admission of that testimony would also be
affirmed under less-stringent federal standards.
D.

Id.

Lack of Prejudice.
Finally, defendant cannot complain of being unfairly

prejudiced by Mouille's eyewitness testimony.

The jury was fully

apprised of the uncertainty of Mouille's identification of
defendant as the robber.

It learned that Mouille had been unable

to identify defendant from a photo array, and that he had
hesitantly selected defendant from the live lineup, prior to his
in-court identification (T. 106, 110-13).

The jury was

instructed in detail, as required in Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493-94
nn.7 & 8, about its duty to decide the eyewitness reliability,
and the applicable reliability factors (R. 84-87, copied at the
19

appendix to this brief; compare Long instruction at appendix to
Br. of Appellant).

In closing argument, the prosecutor

acknowledged the identification problems; defense counsel
hammered away at them (T. 440-42, 452-53).
The jury was properly warned, then, to beware of
Mouille's identification of defendant, and to view it with
healthy skepticism.

All in all, there was neither error in the

admission of Mouille's identification testimony, nor undue harm
resulting from that testimony.
POINT THREE
STATEMENTS MADE BY ONE OF DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED
COCONSPIRATORS WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO
EVIDENCE AGAINST DEFENDANT.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erroneously
admitted statements made by Cary Nichols, one of his alleged
robbery coconspirators, into evidence against him.

Some of those

statements were made during Nichols's visit to the Ogden UPS
center before the robbery; another statement consisted of his
inquiry to a UPS co-worker about the handling of money; other
statements were made during the police-monitored post-robbery
conversation with LeeAnn Leavitt and Shannon Fairbanks (Br. of
Appellant at 23-24).

Defendant identifies State v. Gray, 717

P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986), construing Rule 801(d)(2)(E), Utah Rules
of Evidence, as controlling this issue (the text of Rule 801 is
appended to this brief).

Under Gray, and on other bases, the

trial court properly admitted Nichols's statements.
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A.

Admissibility Under Coconspirator Statement Rule.
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) makes coconspirator statements

admissible against a criminal defendant as non-hearsay.

Gray,

717 P.2d at 1317. The conspiracy need not even be charged, i^d.
at 1318; thus dismissal of the conspiracy charge against
defendant did not render the coconspirator statements
inadmissible.

To admit such statements, the conspiracy must be

found to exist, but only by a preponderance of evidence that is
independent of the statements themselves. J^i. at 1318-19.

Such

a finding is overturned on appeal only if it is clearly
erroneous.

See id. at 1316.

When it dismissed the conspiracy charge against
defendant, the trial court explained that it nevertheless was
admitting "all of the evidence" of conspiracy previously
accepted, including the coconspirator statements, for the purpose
of deciding the remaining robbery charge (T. 465-66).

The

court's finding of a conspiracy, implicit in that ruling, was not
clearly erroneous.
Defendant has marshalled much of the independent
evidence of a conspiracy:

he acknowledges Cary Nichols's

employment at UPS, and Nichols's unusual visit to the Ogden UPS
center with Troy Powell before the robbery.

He acknowledges his

own friendship with Nichols and Powell, his co-driver status on a
Cadillac rented to Nichols, and the presence of his fingerprint
on LeeAnn Leavitt's business card, left at Powell's apartment and
later recovered among the robbery proceeds (Br. of Appellant at
21

25).

Other evidence tending to show a robbery conspiracy, and

defendant's involvement in it, includes his own after-hours visit
to the Ogden UPS center before the robbery (T. 142, 176).
Defendant argues that the foregoing evidence is
insufficient, as a matter of law, to show conspiracy by a
preponderance of the evidence.

He seems to suggest that because

no single piece of that evidence, by itself, amounts to clearly
criminal conduct, or relates actual, articulated robbery plans,
it cannot independently establish conspiracy (Br. of Appellant at
26).

He points out that in Gray, 717 P.2d at 1319-20, the

defendant himself made statements about the criminal
transactions.

Also, in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1143-44

(Utah 1989), the defendant participated in meetings where
criminal plans were discussed.
Neither Gray nor Johnson, however, hold that actual
criminal activity or explicit involvement in criminal planning is
a required component of the independent evidence needed to admit
statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy.
Court so hold.
in secrecy:

Nor should this

By its nature, a criminal conspiracy is conducted

the enterprise would be doomed at the outset if

openly planned.

Accordingly, evidence of a conspiracy will often

be indirect and circumstantial, perhaps even innocent on its
face.

Such was the nature of much of the evidence here.

Considered in its entirety, however, that evidence certainly
justified a finding that defendant, Nichols, and Powell were,
jointly, up to no good.

Under Gray and Rule 801(d)(2)(E), then,
22

the trial court did not clearly err in admitting statements that
seemed connected to the probable conspiracy.
B.

Statements Supporting Their Own Admissibility.
Although it should not be necessary for the purpose of

affirming the trial court's ruling here, it is worth noting that
the United States Supreme Court, subsequent to this Court's
decision in Gray, has construed Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E) differently from its identical Utah counterpart.

In

Bouriailv v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987)f the Supreme
Court squarely held that under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the threshold
proof of conspiracy can be satisfied, at least in part, by the
challenged statements themselves.

483 U.S. at 181.

Thus, contrary to Gray, the United States Supreme Court
held that evidence sufficient to make a threshold finding of a
conspiracy, required to admit coconspirator statements at a
criminal trial, need not be wholly independent of the statements
themselves.

In so holding, the Court declared that the

"bootstrapping rule" of Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60
(1942), and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), relied
on by this Court in Gray, 717 P.2d at 1318, had been at least
partly overruled by the modern rules of evidence.

Bouriailv. 483

U.S. at 176-79.
Were it necessary, then, and if this Court were to
adopt the Bourlaily analysis, Nichols's statements could also be
considered in deciding whether a conspiracy was adequately
proven, and therefore whether his statements were properly
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admitted.

Certainly the content of Nichols's statements here was

suspicious:

for example, he falsely claimed that Powell, who

accompanied him on an unusual visit to the Ogden UPS center, was
a new UPS employee (T. 187-89, 337-38).

He also made an unusual

inquiry, before the robbery, about UPS money-handling (T. 21617).

Such statements might well be expected by one who is

"casing" premises targeted for a crime.

Finally, Nichols's post-

robbery meeting with Powell, LeeAnn Leavitt, and Shannon
Fairbanks, discussing the police investigation and ways to avoid
it, also tends to show a robbery conspiracy.
C.

Admissibility as Outside the Hearsay Definition.
Finally, the coconspirator statements challenged by

defendant fall outside the definition of inadmissible hearsay,
quite apart from Rule 801(d)(2)(E).

None of those statements was

offered at trial to "prove the truth of the matter asserted"
therein, under Rule 801(c).
Nichols's statement that Powell was a new UPS employee,
and another statement explaining his own presence at the Ogden
UPS center, were not offered to prove their truth, for the first
statement was in fact false, and the other, dubious.11
they were not hearsay at all.

Thus

Similarly, Nichols's inquiry about

the handling of UPS money was just that—an inquiry, not even a
"statement" within the meaning of hearsay under Rule 801(a).

u

Put

Nichols had also explained his presence at the Ogden UPS
center by saying that he was performing some "hundred weight
audits," part of his duties. The co-worker to whom he gave this
explanation found it odd, because of the unusual hour (T. 196).
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differently, it was the making of the statements or inquiries,
rather than their particular content, that was the admissible,
relevant evidence.
Nor was the post-robbery conversation in LeeAnn
Leavitt's home, just before the arrest of Nichols and Powell,
necessarily subject to a hearsay objection.

During that

conversation, Nichols and Powell never admitted involvement in
the robbery:

they discussed the investigation, what the women

should say to investigators, and ways to evade the police (T.
262-64, 289, 365). These aspects of the discussion tended to
show Nichols's and Powell's involvement in the robbery, but
again, were not actual statements to that effect.
Because of defendant's close association with Nichols
and Powell, the post-robbery discussion tended to prove
defendant's involvement as well.12 Perhaps that discussion
might have been excluded under Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence
(probative value substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice).
However, no such objection was made at trial; nor is one pursued
on appeal.

Further, the discussion's impact appears minimal in

light of all the other evidence, and thus harmless even if it was
erroneously admitted.

See Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence

(timely objection requirement, and harmless error rule).
Defendant has not shown clear, prejudicial error in the
trial court's admission of coconspirator statements that helped
12

It might have been more prouative, but the trial court did
not allow mention of defendant during the discussion to be
disclosed to the jury (T. 265-66, 366, T. 8/20/90 at 5).
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prove his guilt in this robbery.

In this respect then, as with

the other points raised on appeal, his conviction is sound.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction
should be affirmed•
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APPENDIX I
Precautionary Eyewitness Identification Instruction,
Given to Trial Jury.

INSTRUCTION NO.

I'

One of the issues in this case is the identification of
the

defendant

as the person who

committed

the

crime.

The

prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt,
not

only

that

the

crime was

committed,

but

also

defendant was the person who committed the crime.

that

the

If, after

considering the evidence you have heard from both sides, you are
not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
the person who committed the crime, you must find the defendant
not guilty.
The identification testimony that you have heard was an
expression of belief or impression by the witness.
defendant

not

identification

guilty,
witness

you
was

need

not

insincere,

To find the

believe

but

merely

that
that

the
the

witness was mistaken in his belief or impression.
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification.
considering

whether

the

prosecution

has

proved

beyond

In
a

reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed
the crime, you should consider the following:
1)

Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to

observe the criminal actor?
In answering this question, you should consider:

2)

a)

the
length
of
time
observed the actor;

the

witness

b)

the distance between the witness
the actor;

c)

the
extent
to
which
the
actor's
features were visible and undisguised;

d)

the light or lack of light
place and time of observation;

e)

the presence or absence of distracting
noises
or
activity
during
the
observation;

f)

any other circumstances affecting the
witness' opportunity to observe the
person committing the crime.

at

and

the

Did the witness have the capacity to observe the person

committing

the

crime?

In

answering

this

question,

should consider whether the witness' capacity was

you

impaired

by:
a)

stress or fright
observation;

at

the

b)

personal
motivations,
prejudices;

c)

uncorrected visual defects;

d)

fatigue or injury;

e)

drugs or alcohol.

time

biases

of
or

You should also consider whether the witness is of
a different race than the criminal actor.
a

person

of

a

different

race may

be

Identification by

less

reliable

that

indentification by a person of the same race.
3)

Was the witness sufficiently attentive to the

criminal actor at the time of the crime?

In answering this question, you should consider
whether the witness knew that a crime was taking place
during the time he observed the actor.
had

adequate

opportunity

and

Even if the witness

capacity

to

observe

the

criminal actor, he may not have done so unless he was aware
that a crime was being committed.
4)

Was

the

witness'

identification

of

the

defendant completely the product of his own memory.
In answering this question, you should consider:
a)

the length of time that passed between
the witness; original observation and
his identification of the defendant;

b)

the witness# mental capacity and state
of mind at the time of identification;

c)

the witness' exposure to opinions,
descriptions or identifications or
newspaper accounts, or to any other
information or influence that may have
affected
the
independence
of his
identification;

d)

any instances when the witness, or any
eyewitness to the crime, failed to
identify the defendant;

e)

any instances when the witness, or any
eyewitness to the crime, gave a
description of the actor that is
inconsistent
with
the
defendant's
appearance;

f)

the circumstances under which the
defendant was presented to the witness
for identification.

You may take into account that an identification
made by picking
individuals

the defendant

is

generally

from

more

a

group

reliable

of

similar

than

an

identification made from the defendant being presented alone
to the witness.
You

may

also

take

into

account

that

identifications made from seeing the person are generally
more reliable than identifications made from a photograph.
I again emphasize that the burden of proving that
the defendant is the person who committed the crime is on
the prosecution.

If, after considering the evidence you

have heard from the prosecution and from the defense, and
after evaluating the eyewitness testimony in light of the
considerations listed above, you have a reasonable doubt
about whether the defendant is the person who committed the
crime, you must find him not guilty.

APPENDIX II
Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence.

Rule 801

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

ARTICLE VIIL
HEARSAY.
Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.
(b) Declarant A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, ofifered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony or
the witness denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B)
consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or
implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after
perceiving him; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent The statement is offered
against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual
or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a
person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter
within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Advisory Committee Note. — Subsection

Utah case law, State v. Owena, 15 Utah 2d 123,

